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Sandra Day O`Connor on Drugs
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Interstate commerce laws do not apply to personal marijuana
However, Justices Sandra Day O�Connor and Ruth Bader Ginsburg appeared to support the arguments of the plaintiffs (USA Today, 11/30). �As I understand it, none of this homegrown marijuana will be on any interstate market,� O�Connor said, adding, �And it
is in the area of something traditionally regulated by states. This limited exception (to the drug laws) is a non-economic use--growing for personal use� (Los Angeles Times, 11/30). Ginsburg said that �nobody�s buying anything--nobody�s selling anything.
Source: www.californiahealthline.org, comments on marijuana ruling
, Nov 30, 2004
No tactile inspection by police for drugs.
Justice O'Connor joined the Court's decision on BOND v. UNITED STATES on Apr 17, 2000:
A Texas Border Patrol Agent boarded a bus to check the immigration status of its passengers. He squeezed a canvas bag above Mr. Bond�s seat and noticed that it contained a �brick-like� object. After petitioner admitted owning the bag and consented to its search, the Agent discovered a �brick� of methamphetamine.
Held:
(Rehnquist, joined by Stevens, O�Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg)
The Agent physical manipulation of petitioner�s carry-on bag violated the Fourth Amendment�s proscription against unreasonable searches. The Government�s assertion that by exposing his bag to the public, petitioner lost a reasonable expectation that his bag would not be physically manipulated is rejected. [Previous precedents allowing searches] involved only visual, as opposed to tactile, observation. Physically invasive inspection is simply more intrusive than purely visual inspection. Dissent:
(Breyer, joined by Scalia)
Does a traveler who places a soft-sided bag in the shared overhead storage compartment of a bus have a �reasonable expectation� that strangers will not push, pull, prod, squeeze, or otherwise manipulate his luggage? I believe that he does not. The Fourth Amendment protects against government intrusion that upsets an �actual (subjective) expectation of privacy� that is objectively �reasonable.� But an individual cannot reasonably expect privacy in respect to objects or activities that he �knowingly exposes to the public.� Nor can I accept the majority�s effort to distinguish �tactile� from �visual� interventions. Whether tactile manipulation (say, of the exterior of luggage) is more intrusive or less intrusive than visual observation (say, through a lighted window) necessarily depends on the particular circumstances, [which would] lead to a constitutional jurisprudence of �squeezes,� thereby complicating further already complex Fourth Amendment law. For these reasons, I dissent.
Source: Supreme Court case 98-9349 argued on Feb 29, 2000
No roadblocks with drug-sniffing dogs.
Justice O'Connor wrote the Court's decision on CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS v. EDMOND on Nov 28, 2000:
Indianapolis operates vehicle checkpoints on its roads in an effort to interdict unlawful drugs. Mr. Edmond was stopped at such a checkpoint, and filed suit, claiming that the roadblocks violated the Fourth Amendment�s rule that a search or seizure is unreasonable absent individualized suspicion of wrongdoing.
Held:
(O�Connor, joined by Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer, & Stevens)
We previously held that brief, suspicionless seizures at highway checkpoints for the purposes of combating drunk driving and intercepting illegal immigrants were constitutional. We now consider [applying that to] illegal narcotics. Because the checkpoint program�s primary purpose is indistinguishable from the general interest in crime control, the checkpoints violate the Fourth Amendment.Dissent:
(Rehnquist, joined by Scalia & Thomas)
The State�s use of a drug-sniffing dog, according to the Court�s holding,
annuls what is otherwise plainly constitutional under our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence: brief, standardized, discretionless, roadblock seizures of automobiles, seizures which effectively serve a weighty state interest with only minimal intrusion on the privacy of their occupants. Because these seizures serve the State�s accepted and significant interests of preventing drunken driving and checking for driver�s licenses and vehicle registrations, and because there is nothing in the record to indicate that the addition of the dog sniff lengthens these otherwise legitimate seizures, I dissent.Additional dissent:
(Thomas)
I am not convinced [the original drunk-driving & immigration roadblock cases] were correctly decided. I rather doubt that the Framers would have considered �reasonable� a program of indiscriminate stops of individuals not suspected of wrongdoing. But Mr. Edmond did not advocate the overruling [of the original cases, so I join in the dissent].
Source: Supreme Court case 99-1030 argued on Oct 3, 2000
Page last updated: Feb 02, 2020